Iran vs. Venezuela: A Strategic and Military Comparison

Posted on February 3, 2026

Note: Information for this assessment was derived from open sources available on the internet. Where opinion is implied, those opinions reflect the opinions of the author. CAPTAIN Castro-Mendoza is a retired US Navy Captain and earned a Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. Mention of his retired military rank or degree does not imply endorsement of this assessment by the US Navy or the Department of Defense.

While the Trump Administration contemplates the use of force against Iran, it is worthy to make a comparison between Venezuela’s and Iran’s military capabilities. Operation Absolute Resolve to capture and apprehend Maduro was limited in duration and scope with little resistance from the Venezuelan Armed Forces and Maduro’s security force, and apparently beyond all the sabre rattling by the Trump Administration, there was no intent to involve the US in a more prolonged war, and the Venezuelan Armed Forces became quite content to remain in place. While the operation was flawlessly executed by US forces, the target was much more manageable on a number of fronts. Imagine if US forces had to penetrate deep into Iranian territory, for example, to Tehran, to capture or kill Iranian leadership. Such an operation would require significantly more forces and of a different composition. Additionally, Iran and Venezuela differ dramatically across geography, military capabilities, strategic doctrine, and regime resilience. Understanding these differences is vital for shaping realistic military and policy options for Iran.

Iran is a large, geographically diverse nation covering roughly 1.65 million square kilometers, with mountainous terrain, broad deserts and over 2,400 km of coastline on the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. Its mountain ranges—like the Zagros and Alborz—provide strategic depth, natural defenses, and space for dispersed and hardened military installations. Iran’s geographic complexity gives it strategic depth that hinders rapid invasion and allows it to absorb initial strikes while retaliating from concealed positions.

In contrast, Venezuela is smaller—about 916,445 square kilometers—with a wide northern coastline on the Caribbean, extensive lowland plains (llanos), and the Guiana Highlands in the southeast. While varied, Venezuela’s terrain lacks the same combination of strategic depth and defensible internal geography found in Iran.

Iran’s location in the Middle East fundamentally shapes its strategic posture. It dominates the northern shore of the Persian Gulf and the strategic chokepoint, the narrow Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20-30% of the world’s seaborne oil exports pass, much of it going to China. Iran’s geography allows it to threaten maritime traffic through this strait—comprised of narrow shipping lanes and shallow waters averaging about 50 meters deep—using mines, small boats, coastal missiles, and submarines giving Iran a strategic layered defense.

Iran’s naval doctrine explicitly prioritizes anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) operation in this confined sea space. Its Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) emphasizes asymmetric warfare: fast attack craft, swarm tactics, shore-based missiles, and mines specifically to deny hostile navies easy access to the Gulf. It’s strategic missile forces composed mostly of SCUD medium range ballistic missiles can also range the entire gulf region.

Venezuela’s geography, though strategically relevant in the Caribbean, lacks an equivalent global chokepoint and thus allows an attacking force multiple attack axis unhindered by adjacent countries’ landmasses that may or may not allow US air forces overflight authority. Venezuela’s coastline facing the Caribbean and Atlantic is important regionally, but does not control globally critical maritime routes like Hormuz, and is significantly more open to attack, as Iran is shielded by neighbors in almost every direction that may be unlikely to cede airspace to attacking aircraft.

Iran’s military is comparatively large (fourth largest military in the world) and diversified, combining traditional and asymmetric capabilities. It fields hundreds of thousands of active and reserve personnel across the Islamic Republican Army (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including specialized aerospace and naval components. Iran possesses one of the largest ballistic and cruise missile inventories in the Middle East, with systems capable of ranges up to ~2,000 kilometers. Recent exercises have demonstrated coordinated missile launches near the Strait of Hormuz, including cruise and ballistic missiles, underscoring its strike capability deep into regional space. Naval capabilities emphasize asymmetric sea denial: fast patrol boats, mines, anti-ship missiles launched from coastal batteries and patrol boats, submarines including KILO Class submarines purchased from the now defunct USSR, and backed up by air forces from bases near the coast and deep within the Iranian landmass. Iran also possesses numerous drones of varying capabilities, and increasingly advanced cyber and electronic warfare units.

As already mentioned, Iran’s military is structured in multiple layers. The Artesh handles conventional defensive ground, air and naval units. The IRGC focuses on regime protection and asymmetric warfare—domestic rapid response, naval A2/AD in the Gulf, and support to allied proxies across the region. The Basij militia functions as a large paramilitary internal security and mobilization force.

In contrast, Venezuela’s military (FANB) is smaller and materially weaker. Recent assessments place its active strength roughly around 120,00-125,000 personnel, including army, navy, air force, national guard, plus a large Bolivarian Militia reserve that is politically oriented.

While Venezuela has historically acquired heavier platforms—like Su-30 fighters, tanks and S-300 anti-air missile batteries—years of economic crisis, maintenance shortages, and sanctions have degraded operational readiness. Even fully functional systems are limited in number and effectiveness compared with Iran’s diversified missile and air defense architecture.

Venezuela’s strategic posture has relied more on legacy platforms and limited asymmetric concepts (e.g. militias) than on integrated A2/AD capabilities or long-range strike systems.

Iran’s military doctrine centers on asymmetric deterrence—specifically, the ability to deter or complicate intervention by superior conventional forces (e.g., US 5th Fleet headquartered in Manama, Bahrain) by leveraging geographic advantages and missile forces. Its doctrine includes the possibility of mining the Strait of Hormuz or threatening to close it during conflict, not lightly but as a coercive and strategic deterrent due to the global economic impact such actions would have.

Venezuela has no equivalent strategic doctrine. Its military posture has historically focused on territorial defense and regime survival primarily through internal controls and air defense networks, not through control of global maritime chokepoints or deep-strike capabilities.

Iran’s leadership views military capacity and deterrence as core to regime survival in a volatile region surrounded by U.S. forces and allies of rival states. Tehran’s strategic calculations include maintaining deterrent forces (missiles, proxies, naval denial) that can respond to existential threats not just on borders but across regional theaters. Any operation to liberate the Iranian people from the oppressive leadership is likely to require weeks, if not months, of combat operations including boots on the ground, and is likely to result in American casualties AND may ignite a regional conflict if the Regime fears for its survival. Iran’s military leadership most probably has hardliners that will fight to preserve the regime until most of their forces are vanquished. Anything short of total domination and defeat of Iranian forces by the US military will likely result in increased deaths of the protesting opposition and achieve no real positive results.